CO-HOST JAMIE RICHARDSON: The JFK35 Podcast is made possible through generous support from the Blanche and Irving Laurie Foundation.
[PODCAST INTRO BEGINS]
JOHN F. KENNEDY: I speak of peace, therefore, as the necessary, rational end of rational men. I realized the pursuit of peace is not as dramatic as the pursuit of war. And frequently, the words of the pursuers fall on deaf ears, but we have no more urgent task.
[THEME MUSIC PLAYING]
CO-HOST MATT PORTER: President John F. Kennedy's views on war and peace would be developed from his early years. Kennedy, a child born between two world wars, would see the rise of fascism in his youth, and later serve on the front lines to stop it from spreading across the world. This week, we talk with historian Fredrik Logevall about how growing up alongside the rise and fall of fascism would influence Senator and later President Kennedy, as he navigated the country through the rise of another authoritarian movement in Soviet communism, next on JFK35.
JOHN F. KENNEDY: And so, my fellow Americans, ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country.
[CHEERING] [PODCAST INTRO ENDS] [THEME MUSIC PLAYING]
MATT PORTER: Hello, I'm Matt Porter. Welcome to JFK35. In the 1960s, President John F. Kennedy was in the midst of a Cold War with the Soviet Union. Kennedy had to make some very consequential decisions that could have turned the Cold War into a real one, most notably during the Cuban Missile Crisis, where the two nations stood on the brink of nuclear war.
But in that crisis and at other points, President Kennedy was strongly committed to finding peaceful solutions, using diplomacy over military force. Joining me now is historian Fredrik Logevall, author of a new biography of President Kennedy. The first of two volumes is out right now. And it's called, JFK-- Coming Of Age In The American Century, 1917 to 1956. Fred, thank you for joining me.
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Oh, I'm delighted, as always, to be with you.
MATT PORTER: So, Fred, today we want to talk about President Kennedy, and the fact that he grew up at a very interesting time in the world, where fascist governments were sort of on the rise in his youth, and that a change, as he was going from a young soldier, post World War II. To his president-- to his political career, first in the House, then the Senate, than as president.
So let's start at the beginning. We know when the young John F. Kennedy first visited Germany and Italy as a Harvard Student, on his sort of summer trip with Lem Billings, as a young man, traveling, he actually had positive things to write in his diary at the time about Italy and Germany. What, overall, was the younger Kennedy's impression on that trip of those two countries?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Yeah, I think, as you say, it's a formative time for him. And that initial trip with Lem Billings, I think, as I suggested in my book, really had an influence on both of them. Here they are, young, college students, experiencing the continent for the first time.
I think, in terms of Italy and Germany, they both understood-- certainly Jack Kennedy understood, but I think Billings did too-- that Germany was a force to be reckoned with and would be a force to be reckoned with. They understood that, because of its location in the center of Europe, because of its history, its dynamism, its population, it was destined to be a power.
And, of course, they could see firsthand the effects of Hitler's rule, even if it was still at a relatively early age. I think it was a mixed picture. They both talked, I think-- and JFK in particular, in his diary. It's marvelous for historians that he kept a diary on these travels. And this is one of them. And you see him skeptical about Hitler's propaganda. And he did see, maybe sooner than most, that this was substantially about propaganda, that Hitler and the Nazis were making claims about German society and Germany's role in the world that were really designed to mobilize the German population, more so than, perhaps, reflect what was actually happening in the international system.
So he's quite farsighted in that respect. Could see, on the other hand-- and maybe this is the subtext of your question-- that both the Italians, under Mussolini, and the Germans, under Hitler, had accomplished some things in getting society-- their respective societies, according to JFK-- up from being sort of prostrate after the First World War, after the difficulties following the First World War, and as the phrase goes, had made the trains run on time.
And both of these young men, I think, could see that Hitler, maybe in particular, had, in a domestic sense, in terms of mobilizing the society, had been able to accomplish some things. But it's also striking-- striking, the degree to which he was suspicious, even on that first trip, of Nazis that they encountered. And he wrote about them, the right sort of dogmatic approach that those Nazis took, even in one-on-one interactions with these two young Americans, and a kind of emerging skepticism on his part.
MATT PORTER: You know, I think sometimes those quotes from his early diary, where he is complimenting, sort of, the accomplishments of those two governments, sometimes get taken out of context a bit, and sort of say, oh, look, was President-- was Kennedy a friend of fascism? But how would you describe Kennedy's reaction to those governments, in particular, the style?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: I don't see that level of sympathy for the Germans. His brother, Joe Jr., who, as you know, is the oldest of the nine children, and who was the one deemed, at least by the parents, to be the one destined for greatness, and who was traveling in Europe, very much like Jack is traveling through Europe-- and in one case, in 1939, right on the eve of war, a remarkable moment-- and that's where I opened my book, actually. Both of them are in Berlin, if you can imagine, and cross paths, briefly. Joe Jr. is full of admiration, to an unsettling degree, in my view-- admiration for Nazi Germany and for what the government is doing, even for the way it's handling minority populations of different kinds, and expresses often, and quite loudly, that admiration.
The materials I've seen-- and I've been through everything that's at the Kennedy Library on this, I think-- you don't see that with JFK. There is a kind of grudging, I would say, support for, or admiration for, some of the things that the government has accomplished. And they're impressed, for example, by the roadways that they travel on in Germany. And they remark on that to each other. But yeah, I think you're right. I think they've been taken out of context to the degree that people have written about this. And it does not convey, it seems to me, a much more neutral to critical, I guess, is how I would put it, attitude that he has for Nazi Germany in particular.
MATT PORTER: And you mentioned his brother Joe and also the father, Joe Sr., had very particular views on this-- was an isolationist. When-- you describe in your book, when Kennedy got to Harvard, it was sort of a time where there were two sides. Were you were an isolationist or were you someone who wanted to join the fight? President Kennedy had his family views-- his family's-- you know, his father and certainly his older brother supported the isolationist views at the time. But how did the young John F. Kennedy, at that time, end up developing his own, independent view. And why do you think it ended up being different from his father and his older brother?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Oh, yeah, this is a strong, at least, subtheme in my book. It's actually dominates several chapters-- shall we call it the Harvard years of John F. Kennedy-- is this emerging split between father and son, and between son and older brother. I think it's a very important part of the story.
And one of the things, Matt, that surprised me in the research, is that the Harvard student body-- and part of this is reflected in The Crimson, which as you know is as the school paper. But The Crimson and, I would say, the undergraduate sentiment in general was strongly isolationist. Some historians don't like the term isolationism because they don't think it reflects what's actually-- what many adherents to that view hold, but for the purpose of this discussion today, let's continue to use isolationism.
So it makes JFK's position all the more remarkable is that he is gradually splitting, not only from his father and his older brother, but in some respects, from what his classmates, his schoolmates, are themselves feeling, which is, we, the United States, should stay out of this fight. This is not our fight. We should defend our own geographic approaches, perhaps defend the hemisphere, but this is a fight for the Europeans. And moreover, we don't really want to get into it with Japan, either, in Asia.
I think the answer to your question is that little by little, because he's initially quite sympathetic to this view, JFK, little by little, partly through coursework, because the professors at Harvard tended to be much more interventionist than the students-- so he's immersed in these courses. He's talking with his professors-- partly his own experiences, and this gets back to what we're talking about, which is the travels through Europe, maybe especially in 1939 when he has that amazing, amazing study abroad experience, spends about six months traveling through Europe, also works for his father in the embassy in London.
I think all of this together, and then finally his work on his senior thesis in 1939-1940, convinces JFK that isolation is unwinnable, that the United States needs to be massively engaged in at least helping the British, in particular, but might, at some point, need to get into the fight itself. I think that's a conviction he comes to. And so he's deeply split from his father.
And to his father's credit, he's OK with this. One of the things that is remarkable about Joe Kennedy is he does not insist that his children adhere to his particular worldview. So he's fine with Jack taking a different position. Nevertheless, Jack does. And I think it's really important going forward.
MATT PORTER: Yeah, and in a period where if your father supports isolationism, your older brother, your student body, what do you think it says about President Kennedy's character that, despite probably a lot of pressure from his collegiate friends and his family, he still developed this view and expressed it.
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Yeah, I think it suggests a certain intellectual confidence. And I don't want to suggest here in our conversation that he's dogmatic or he's certain 100% all of the time. I think it's a process.
I think he wavers to a certain degree. I think he accepts-- he famously writes-- maybe we should say infamously writes-- an editorial, or an op-ed, maybe we would say, for The Crimson, in which he basically follows his father's position. This is in the fall of 1939. So as late as that point he's a little bit uncertain.
But I think it speaks, Matt, to his emerging confidence. He's been interested in history and in international affairs since a young age. He was a precocious reader. He was sick a lot of the time, didn't have much to do when he was bedridden other than read biography, and history, and works of strategy and statecraft.
So he had developed an interest, a confidence. He had a familiarity with different conceptions of national interest and he was comfortable with that, but more and more, came to see that the United States was going to have to play a key role. It could not do what it did after World War I, according to JFK, which was to withdraw from world affairs, to isolate itself. That would not do in this instance. He felt certain of that and was prepared to live that philosophy.
MATT PORTER: And we're going to skip a little ahead. And I know there are lots of things to talk about in his collegiate years, particularly the book, Why England Slept, the thesis discussing the matter of that England was too slow to react to Germany. But once the US decides to get into the war, Kennedy is determined to be a part of it. Can you talk briefly about how Kennedy tries to get into the war, especially the lengths he goes, being someone who could have easily been rejected for his health?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Yeah, it's quite amazing, actually, because with his father's help, he was able to secure a desk job in Washington, which he had in the fall of 1941. And because he had had these health problems, he had every reason in the world to basically accept that kind of position. A lot of people worked through the war in those kinds of positions and proudly so.
It was very important to have people of caliber, of quality, in, say, Naval intelligence or comparable kinds of positions in Washington. So John F. Kennedy could have easily done that, would have needed to apologize to nobody for having those positions. And that's the position that he had in the fall of '41, so just as Pearl Harbor is happening.
But no, he becomes determined to get into this fight for reasons that have to do with, I think, patriotism. It has to do with a sense that other men from my Harvard class, other young men that I know, are entering the service, are going to be in harm's way. I want to do the same.
I don't think-- I think it's reading too much-- it's reading history backwards to say that this is about his political aspirations, that he wants to enter combat because at some point, he's going to run for public office, and therefore, he needs to show that he did. I don't think it's that. Maybe in the back of his mind that exists because he's already interested in politics, I think I show in the book. It's not correct to say that he only enters politics or becomes interested in it after Joe Jr. is killed. Nevertheless, I think it's more about a feeling that this is a kind of existential struggle for the United States and for democracy.
He's really interested in the fate of democracy and he wants to be part of this. And again, through his father's help, even though his father is reluctant-- does not want his two older sons to enter the war. He actually helps both of them do so. And, of course, we know the rest of the story. He, as a Naval officer, JFK goes off to the South Pacific, serves with distinction, and basically, in 1943 into the first days of 1944, and has intense, to say the least, combat experience.
MATT PORTER: And when Kennedy enters the war it's now a different stage of fascism related to America. What do you think's Kennedy's wartime years, compared to those initial visits when he was a younger student, changed his view on dictatorships and fascism as he was viewing them through the eyes of a soldier and being in the trenches?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Yeah, I think it's a searing experience for him, that wartime experience, as it would-- as it was, I'm sure, for almost all fighting men, and those women who might have seen combat up close. JFK was no different. I think the experience-- and his letters home, by the way, Matt, are fascinating on this, which are available right there at the Kennedy Library. To read his letters both to parents, to siblings, to his former girlfriend, Inga Arvad, the first real love of his life, to read them is to see a young man who is thinking deeply about the world, about his own place in it, as you say, about the struggle against the Nazis in Europe and against imperial Japan in the Far East, which is the struggle he's engaged in.
I think he comes away from this with a conviction that the struggle is vitally important. I don't think he ever changes his mind that this was necessary to do for the fate of the West, for the fate of the United States, for democracy. So I think the experience confirms the view he had going in, that this was a hugely important battle for the United States and for John F. Kennedy to fight.
He also has other-- he draws other conclusions. I think he's skeptical-- become skeptical about many of the decisions that the military brass that his superior officers and their superior officers make on the strategic level, tactical level. More interestingly, perhaps, I think he comes away from this also with the view that the military instrument is a very blunt instrument. It's not necessarily good at solving questions that are, at their root, political. That's, I think, a point of view that he develops and I think it's there throughout the rest of his life. And so in the second volume of my biography I want to flesh that out. I want to develop that, see if it actually holds when I get into some of the later research for this. But no doubt that the war has a really important effect on his thinking.
MATT PORTER: Yeah, in your book, the part that was interesting for me is you write about President Kennedy at home, before he went out to the Pacific, would see the ads, the recruitment videos and sort of romanticizing war. And then he was out there and seeing the reality. And yeah, you're right, he wrote a lot about the generals, and the politicians, and their decision making. How do you think that experience affected him when he would become a Senator and President where he would be making those decisions for soldiers abroad?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Yeah, I think there's no question that those months-- well, let's take the war years as a whole, but in particular those months that he had in the Solomons in the Pacific War, stayed with him for the rest of his life, influenced his decision about the use of force when he became president, and also the supporting the use of force, before that, both as a member of the House beginning in 1947, as a member of the Senate in 1953.
I mean, he comes out-- this is an important point, I think. He comes out of the war with these two broad convictions, which are in some ways almost contradictory, although I don't think necessarily so. First he comes out of the war with the belief that the United States, after this struggle, must play a central role in world affairs, has to be first among equals because of its power, because of its geographic advantages, its demographic advantages. It's going to have to be hugely involved in a collective way. He believes already, I think, in collective security and working with allies. So that's one conviction.
The second one is that he, as I already indicated, he is, I think, skeptical of the use of military force to solve world problems. And I think when he becomes president, and even as a senator, I think he's reluctant to commit, certainly, major ground forces to international struggles, especially-- and this is a point we should make-- his conviction that in a nuclear age-- this is of course after Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And the United States is a nuclear power. Then the Soviets become a nuclear power. Then we see other members of-- a few other countries that develop nuclear weapons. He just thinks war is an impossibility in the nuclear age. And I think that guides his decision making in important ways.
MATT PORTER: Yeah, and that influence would be ultimately tested in October, 1962, the-- what would become known as the Cuban Missile Crisis, where both the Soviet Union and the US were posturing, both with nuclear weapons. Kennedy has people telling him both-- people who are against using the weapons or are trying to find a peaceful way out of the situation, but then he also had politicians and generals telling him that it started, the war had begun and it was fate. How do you think all those influences from Kennedy, as a young man, to his time in the war, and then even his time after when he was covering the first organization of the United Nations, and seeing, for the first time, basically, international cooperation in a way that we hadn't seen, how did all of that lead to how he worked through his decision making during those fateful days in October?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Yeah, your reference to his stint as a journalist at the end of World War II is noteworthy. I do think, as you say, seeing up close the aftermath of the war-- and, in fact, when he's in San Francisco for the founding of the UN, the Asia-- the Pacific War is still going. But interacting with the leaders of the world as this young man, I think, had an important effect on him. Among other things, I believe it instilled in him the belief that diplomacy, however flawed it might be, however imperfect the negotiations might be, now with some-- was going to have to be a crucial part of America's strategic arsenal.
And I think that, in combination, again, with this skepticism about military force, this aversion to even considering the use of nuclear weapons, all of those things, in a sense, come together, I think, Matt, in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Maybe I'm drawing too straight a line, but I think it works to say that what you see is a president, then, who believes in diplomacy and seeking peaceful resolutions to international conflict, including right here, with respect to Cuba in October of '62, reluctance to use military force, and in particular, if we're talking about superpower confrontation, getting into it with the Soviets in a way that could yield nuclear Armageddon. I think that drives him in this crisis.
And I would say, by the way-- maybe modify slightly what you said-- I think what's remarkable here is how few advisors around him, for much of the crisis, are counseling a political solution. I think it's mostly very hawkish advice that he gets in the first week or so of the crisis. And so I am stunned that Kennedy stands kind of alone in these Excom discussions, the discussions with his executive committee his chief advisors.
He's often quite alone in saying, we need to try to find a particular solution to this crisis, we need to see things from Khrushchev's perspective. He has a kind of empathy there, which I think also, in part, draws back to his wartime-- his own wartime experience. Got to be able to see things from your adversary's perspective.
That's, I think, where one can draw a pretty straight line, which I think is what your question is suggesting, between that wartime experience and what he's now having to do during these 13 days in October, 1962. And I think the tapes show, the other materials we have show that he's committed, from a pretty early point, in finding some way, short of war, to get the missiles out of Cuba.
We should note he and he and his administration, Matt, bear a significant responsibility for creating the crisis in the first place. So I don't mean to suggest that he's perfect here or that he made no mistakes. But once the crisis begins, I find hard-- I find it hard to fault his approach.
MATT PORTER: The missiles in Turkey, of course, being placed was the start of that, so there's lots to say about that. Speaking of his presidency, President Kennedy spoke a lot, in different times, about the importance of peace, peaceful coexistence of the nations of the world, there, particularly, at that speech at American University. But throughout his presidency, peace was often intertwined with his language. It was contrasted to a time where many other dictators and other politicians went the opposite, talked a lot about fire and fury, even avoiding peace because they didn't want to sound too weak to their voters, or constituents, or whoever they represented. For a president like Kennedy, born between two world wars, how do you think that influenced his focus on peace?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: Well, I think it's a good question. I think it did in important ways. I think, again, as we've been discussing, seeing total war up close, experiencing it, convinced him of two things.
One is that military power is essential, that the United States, in order to be the superpower, which he kind of sensed that it would become after the war, would need to have a very strong military-- so he was not in any doubt about that-- and might need, on occasion, to use that military power. But I think he also became convinced that diplomacy would be just as important, and that you would need to try to resolve disputes, especially in a nuclear age, through peaceful means. And I think he, for the most part, lived that, if I can put it like that, during his 1,000 days as president.
You mentioned the American University speech, one of the great speeches by an American Statesman, I would argue, ever, not just in the 20th century or the mid-20th century, but throughout the nation's history. It's a remarkable speech. But we can point to other examples before even the Missile Crisis, which was the year before. Really, from his early days as president, even portions of the inaugural address, give a sense of this interest in, this commitment to diplomacy and to negotiations. He says, "Let us never negotiate out of fear. But let us never fear to negotiate." I think that's an important line.
We should also note that he is an ambitious politician, a savvy politician. So, as you point out, Matt, politicians feared looking weak. He was no different. I think when he's running for president, if you look at his speech making-- and throughout the 1950s, but especially in those final years when he's gearing up-- there's a lot of emphasis on strength, on firmness, a lot of anti-communist fervor in his speeches. So I don't want to exaggerate this. But I do think underneath that is also a conviction which he acts upon at various points in his presidency, to see negotiations and diplomacy not as expressions of weakness, quite on the contrary, something that the United States needs to commit itself to in a serious way.
MATT PORTER: And my last question-- the last 30 years, we've had two presidents who were veterans, and only one a veteran of a foreign war, George Bush Sr., who also, like Kennedy, served in the Pacific theater of World War II. Most presidents don't have the experience Kennedy had coming into the office, from his wartime experience. And how do you think that can affect their decision making, good or bad? And what lessons do you think John F Kennedy's experience, presidents without wartime experience, could learn from Kennedy?
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: I've thought about that, actually. And you're quite right to mention George H.W. Bush, whose experience was, in some ways, quite similar-- the same part of the world, same era. And I think if you look at the two of them, and if you look at others who didn't become president, but rose in the American government to other positions-- might serve in the cabinet, might serve, perhaps, in state government, or in other positions-- I do think you see commonalities. It's not that they all interpret the war and its importance in exactly the same way, but there's a certain, I think, humility that comes from this experience, a sense that we're part of something bigger, and we're a relatively smart part of this.
But our duty, in a sense, is to try to serve the United States. protect its interests abroad, but also think more broadly. And I think that's something that both of these men shared. And I think, as you point out, relatively few public servants have that experience. And of course it's going to be-- some will have served the United States honorably and importantly in other theaters.
So there will be people-- there are people in government now who have military service. There will be people in the future who have military service. But I think what they can learn, whether they have that experience or not, what they can learn from John F. Kennedy, George H.W. Bush, is the importance of understanding the limits of military power, as great as it can be, that they understand, as we've been discussing, the importance of seeking diplomatic solutions wherever possible, of a-- I don't know what to call it, exactly-- but a kind of intellectual humility that I think can really serve people well in positions of power, to know that the military option really should be the last option and should be utilized only when there are no other-- when you've exhausted all other possibilities in handling whatever the crisis is of the moment. I don't think military service is necessary at all to have that philosophy. But I think it's something that you see in these two gentlemen and in others who have had it, therefore, we can learn something from it.
MATT PORTER: Well, thank you so much, Fred, for talking about this subject. It's all part of your new book, volume one of your biography on JFK, which is called, JFK-- Coming of Age in the American Century, 1917-1956. And it is on bookstore shelves now. So if you are looking for a holiday gifts. it's a great one for the history buff in your family, or a friend. Thank you, Fred, for joining us.
FREDRIK LOGEVALL: It's been great to be with you, Matt. You take care.
[THEME MUSIC PLAYING]
MATT PORTER: Thank you for listening to this episode of JFK35, a podcast from the JFK Library Foundation. Visit our podcast page at jfklibrary.org/jfk35, where we will have more information on topics mentioned in this episode. If you have questions or story ideas, email us at jfk35pod@jfklfoundation.org, or tweet at us jfklibrary, using the #JFK35. If you liked what you heard today, please consider subscribing to our podcast or leaving us a review wherever you get your podcasts. Thank you for listening and have a great week.
[THEME MUSIC PLAYING]
December 2, 2021